The September 19, 2025, drone strike on Al-Safiya Mosque in El Fasher, Sudan, killed over 70 worshippers during dawn prayers and represents far more than a single war crime. This attack epitomizes the systematic ethnic cleansing campaign that has transformed Sudan's civil war into what the United States officially declared genocide in January 2025. The strike demonstrates how the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are completing the genocidal project their predecessor Janjaweed militias began in Darfur twenty years ago, while the international community struggles to respond effectively to the world's worst humanitarian crisis.
The mosque bombing occurred within a sophisticated 38-kilometer "kill box" of earthen berms that RSF forces have constructed around El Fasher, the last government-controlled city in Darfur. This siege architecture, documented by Yale Humanitarian Research Lab, represents the military culmination of a conflict that has displaced over 15 million people and created famine conditions affecting 25 million Sudanese. Understanding this incident requires grasping how Sudan's 2021 military coup evolved into full civil war, why the same ethnic groups targeted in the 2003–2005 Darfur genocide are being systematically eliminated today, and how regional powers are fueling Africa's deadliest conflict through gold trafficking and weapons supplies.
The stakes extend far beyond Sudan's borders. The siege of El Fasher has become the decisive battleground determining whether Sudan faces territorial partition or unified recovery, while the international community confronts its most serious test of genocide prevention since Rwanda.
The RSF's Genocidal Architecture Around El Fasher
The current siege of El Fasher represents military sophistication that vastly exceeds the Janjaweed militias' capabilities during the 2003–2005 Darfur genocide. RSF forces have constructed 31 kilometers of three-meter-high earthen berms that completely encircle the city, creating what researchers call a literal "kill box" designed to trap nearly one million civilians. This siege architecture includes anti-personnel minefields, strategic chokepoints, and systematic targeting of civilian infrastructure, mosques, hospitals, markets, and displacement camps, to make continued resistance impossible.
The September 19 mosque strike exemplifies this strategic approach. By attacking Al-Safiya Mosque during Fajr prayers at 5:00 AM, RSF forces targeted not just a religious building but the spiritual center of community resistance. The attack killed 70–75 worshippers, including elderly people and children, many displaced persons who had sought refuge in El Fasher from previous RSF campaigns. The timing and target selection reveal the psychological warfare dimensions: attacking during sacred prayers communicates that no space remains safe for the predominantly non-Arab Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa populations the RSF seeks to eliminate.
This represents a significant tactical evolution from the 2003–2005 genocide, when Janjaweed militias primarily attacked rural villages. Today's RSF employs Chinese-made drones, Serbian thermobaric weapons, and UAE-supplied armored vehicles in coordinated urban warfare. The military logic behind civilian infrastructure targeting serves multiple strategic objectives: forcing population displacement to reduce potential government support, creating unsustainable humanitarian conditions, and breaking civilian morale through symbolic attacks on cultural and religious sites.
The sophistication extends to RSF's phased approach. Phase one involved artillery bombardment of military positions. Phase two systematically targeted displacement sites and public facilities. The current phase employs "leaps" strategy, incremental advances from west to east, securing residential blocks while launching surprise attacks. RSF forces have penetrated to within 800 meters of Sudanese Armed Forces headquarters and control neighborhoods less than one kilometer from major military bases.
Twenty Years Later, The Same Victims and Perpetrators
The continuities between the 2003–2005 Darfur genocide and today's campaign are unmistakable: same perpetrators, same victims, same tactics, but on an exponentially larger scale. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo ("Hemedti"), who commands the RSF today, was a prominent Janjaweed leader during the original genocide. His forces are targeting the identical ethnic groups: Fur people (indigenous farmers and traditional rulers), Masalit communities (agricultural populations in western Darfur), and Zaghawa groups (semi-nomadic herders prominent in rebel movements).
The operational similarities are striking. Both campaigns employed scorched earth tactics, including village burning, well poisoning, and crop destruction. Both used systematic sexual violence as a weapon of war to terrorize populations and force displacement. Both coordinated air and ground attacks, though today's RSF operates independently with drones rather than requiring Sudanese Armed Forces air support. The key difference is scale: the current crisis affects 47.5 million people needing humanitarian assistance compared to 2.7 million displaced during the historical genocide.
Omar al-Bashir's regime orchestrated the 2003–2005 genocide by providing air support, arms, and political cover for Janjaweed attacks while denying atrocities internationally. The regime later formalized these militias into the Rapid Support Forces in 2013, providing institutional legitimacy and international recognition. Hemedti transformed from a third-grade dropout camel trader to Sudan's most powerful warlord by controlling gold mining operations worth billions annually and cultivating relationships with regional powers, particularly the UAE.
The International Criminal Court established precedent for prosecuting attacks on religious sites through the Ahmad al-Faqi al-Mahdi case in 2016, the first ICC conviction specifically for targeting religious buildings. The September 19 mosque strike clearly violates Article 8(2)(e)(iv) of the Rome Statute, which defines war crimes as "intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion" unless they constitute military objectives. UN Humanitarian Coordinator Denise Brown explicitly stated that targeting religious buildings constitutes a war crime and demanded investigation and accountability.
Yet the international response remains fragmented. The US genocide determination in January 2025 marked only the eighth such declaration since the Cold War, accompanied by sanctions on Hemedti and RSF-linked companies. However, weapons continue flowing through UAE supply networks documented by UN investigators, while diplomatic efforts remain divided across multiple competing mediation tracks.
The Gold Trade Fueling Genocide
Sudan's conflict is fundamentally sustained by a $1 billion annual gold trade that directly finances weapons purchases for both warring parties. This economic dimension transforms the crisis from temporary political violence into a self-sustaining war economy where genocide becomes profitable. Over 100 kilograms of gold disappear daily across Sudan's borders, more than 60 tonnes since fighting began, with the UAE serving as the primary destination market through Dubai's gold trading hub.
The RSF controls key mining areas in Darfur, particularly the Songo mines in Al-Radom, while maintaining complex financial networks spanning 50+ companies across multiple industries. Hemedti's company al-Junaid, managed by his brother Abdul Rahim, transformed from regional trading operation into multinational enterprise through UAE partnerships. The UAE absorbed 46 tonnes of Sudanese gold worth $2.8 billion in 2023, providing the foreign currency earnings that enable weapons purchases and military operations.
This economic structure explains the RSF's strategic focus on Darfur consolidation. Controlling El Fasher would complete RSF dominance over Sudan's gold-producing regions while eliminating the ethnic groups whose traditional territories contain these resources. The systematic targeting of Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa populations serves both ethnic cleansing objectives and economic consolidation, removing communities with traditional land claims to facilitate mining extraction and export.
Egypt processes 62.85% of its own gold exports through UAE markets, worth $1.65 billion in 2024, demonstrating how regional economies have become structurally dependent on Sudanese gold flows. China's state-owned Norinco Group manufactures the GB50A guided bombs and AH-4 howitzers that RSF forces use in attacks like the mosque strike, with the UAE serving as the only known international buyer of these weapon systems.
The international community's failure to disrupt these gold-to-weapons networks enables genocide continuation. Despite extensive documentation by UN investigators, Amnesty International, and conflict monitoring organizations, arms embargos remain limited to Darfur specifically rather than comprehensive Sudan-wide restrictions. The economic sustainability of war makes military stalemate profitable for both sides while creating massive humanitarian costs.
Regional Proxy War Dynamics
Sudan's civil war has evolved into a complex regional proxy conflict where competing powers pursue strategic interests through military support for different factions. The UAE provides advanced Chinese weapons, drones, and financial backing to the RSF through documented supply flights to Chad's Amdjarass airstrip, 86+ cargo flights since fighting began, while Egypt, Russia, and Turkey support the Sudanese Armed Forces with fighter jets, tanks, and training.
The UAE's motivations extend beyond immediate economic interests to long-term strategic positioning. The $6 billion Abu Amama port project on Sudan's Red Sea coast represents UAE efforts to establish maritime influence, complementing existing positions in Djibouti and Somalia. Control over Sudanese banking (acquired 2005–2013) and agricultural land deals positions the UAE for post-conflict economic dominance. The comprehensive trade ban the UAE imposed on Sudan in August 2025, while maintaining RSF weapons supplies, demonstrates how economic leverage complements military support.
Egypt's involvement reflects multiple strategic calculations. Hosting 210,000 Sudanese refugees plus 4 million pre-war residents creates domestic pressures for conflict resolution. However, Egypt's primary concerns center on Nile water security and preventing Ethiopian influence expansion in Sudan. The 1,276-kilometer Egypt-Sudan border requires stable governance to prevent spillover effects, while joint statements rejecting broader Nile Basin involvement in the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam dispute illustrate diplomatic coordination.
Chad faces the most severe spillover effects, with 1.2 million Sudanese refugees tripling the country's refugee population since April 2023. The humanitarian crisis overwhelms Chad's capacity; arrivals average 1,400 people daily across 32 border entry points, with 88% being women and children and 70% reporting serious human rights violations, including physical violence, sexual assault, detention, and forced recruitment. Yet Chad's government allows RSF supply operations through Amdjarass airstrip while declaring emergencies for food and nutrition crises affecting 1.9 million Chadians.
Ethiopia's position reflects the complex intersection of regional conflicts. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed initially supported RSF forces as allies against the Tigray People's Liberation Front but shifted toward SAF backing following his July 2024 Port Sudan visit. Border disputes in Al-Fashaga District create additional tensions, with Sudan accusing Ethiopia of exploiting war conditions to deploy militias in contested areas.
International Community's Failed Response
The international response to Sudan's crisis exemplifies the fundamental weaknesses in contemporary genocide prevention mechanisms. Despite extensive documentation of mass atrocities, systematic targeting of civilian infrastructure, and clear violation of international humanitarian law, international interventions remain limited to sanctions, humanitarian aid, and competing diplomatic initiatives that fail to address the conflict's structural drivers.
Multiple mediation tracks operate simultaneously without coordination: the US-Saudi Jeddah process focuses on humanitarian access rather than conflict resolution; African Union-IGAD consultations emphasize civilian political participation; and the September 2025 US-Egypt-Saudi-UAE "Quad" initiative proposes three-month humanitarian truces through existing frameworks. This proliferation of diplomatic efforts reflects international disagreement about strategy rather than a comprehensive approach to genocide prevention.
Funding represents perhaps the most glaring failure. The $4.2 billion humanitarian response plan remains only 21% funded, while the $1.8 billion regional refugee response plan for neighboring countries has received just 4.7% of required resources. The London Sudan Conference in April 2025 generated significant attention but inadequate financial commitments; the EU's €522 million pledge sounds substantial until compared against the actual needs of $6 billion annually.
Arms embargo enforcement demonstrates similar inadequacy. The UN maintains arms restrictions on Darfur specifically, in place since 2004 but repeatedly violated by all parties. However, the embargo doesn't cover other Sudanese regions where RSF and SAF forces operate, and neighboring countries facilitate weapons transit with minimal consequences. Recent congressional efforts to block UAE arms sales represent positive steps, but unilateral measures cannot substitute for comprehensive multilateral enforcement mechanisms.
The structural problem extends beyond specific policy failures to fundamental questions about sovereignty and intervention. Unlike humanitarian crises requiring external assistance, genocide prevention often demands limiting state and non-state actor capabilities to commit mass atrocities. The international community proves more capable of documenting atrocities than preventing them, creating detailed evidence for future accountability processes while failing to protect vulnerable populations in real-time.
The Battle for Sudan's Future
The siege of El Fasher has become the strategic fulcrum determining whether Sudan faces territorial partition or potential reunification. If RSF forces complete their conquest of the city, they will achieve total control over Darfur's five states, creating conditions for the autonomous "Government of Peace and Unity" they announced in February 2025. This would establish a de facto partition while eliminating the remaining non-Arab populations through completed ethnic cleansing campaigns.
The humanitarian consequences of El Fasher's fall would be catastrophic. Nearly one million people remain trapped within the siege perimeter, including 500,000 in Zamzam camp, where famine conditions have persisted since August 2024. UN agencies warn of "catastrophic" consequences, including massive refugee flows into Chad, complete collapse of humanitarian operations in Darfur, and potential spillover conflicts affecting regional stability. The symbolic impact would demonstrate international impotence to prevent genocide even when extensively documented in real-time.
Conversely, successful defense of El Fasher could shift broader conflict dynamics. SAF forces achieved significant momentum, recapturing Khartoum's Presidential Palace in March 2025, breaking multiple RSF sieges, and linking previously isolated military bases. The Joint Darfur Force coalition of former rebel groups defending El Fasher alongside SAF troops represents the type of unified resistance that could potentially reverse RSF territorial gains.
Recent military developments suggest the conflict may be entering a decisive phase. RSF drone strikes on Port Sudan in May 2025 demonstrated 550-kilometer range capabilities, bringing Sudan's de facto capital under threat. However, SAF acquisition of advanced weaponry from unnamed sources and enhanced air capabilities could restore military balance. The sophistication of RSF's siege tactics around El Fasher, including Chinese drones, Serbian explosives, and UAE armored vehicles, illustrates how external support determines battlefield outcomes more than local military capacity.
The September 19 mosque strike epitomizes how civilian targeting has become central to military strategy rather than collateral damage. By systematically destroying religious sites, hospitals, schools, and markets, RSF forces aim to make continued resistance impossible while forcing ethnic cleansing through terror. This represents the logical endpoint of genocidal warfare, where military victory requires not just defeating enemy forces but eliminating the civilian populations that might support them.
The international community confronts perhaps its most serious genocide prevention test since Rwanda. The systematic nature of atrocities, clear documentation by credible organizations, explicit warnings from UN agencies, and formal US genocide determination create overwhelming evidence for international action. Yet the response remains characterized by inadequate funding, fragmented diplomacy, ineffective arms embargos, and unwillingness to confront regional powers, enabling mass atrocities.
Sudan's crisis ultimately reflects broader questions about international order in an era of great power competition. The UAE's willingness to supply weapons for genocidal campaigns while maintaining normal diplomatic relations demonstrates how regional powers calculate that international consequences remain manageable. China's manufacturing of specialized weapons systems used in attacks like the mosque strike, combined with "non-interference" policies that avoid accountability, illustrates how global powers enable mass atrocities through studied neutrality.
The mosque strike in El Fasher will likely be remembered as either a turning point toward effective international intervention or a symbol of genocide prevention's fundamental failure. The 70+ civilians killed during dawn prayers represent not just individual tragedies but the broader international community's inability to translate early warning systems, legal frameworks, and documentary evidence into protective action for vulnerable populations. Whether Sudan's crisis catalyzes more effective genocide prevention mechanisms or demonstrates their ultimate inadequacy will determine not only Sudan's future but the credibility of international humanitarian law itself.